

THE BAZAINE TRIAL.

The Responsibility of Bazine Before History—What He Did and What He Should Have Done.

Duty of Military Commanders Henceforth.

A Warning to Generals in All Lands.

PARIS, Dec. 21, 1873.

Before Marshal Bazaine's trial assumes the dimensions of a historical event it may be well to take a glance at its main bearings and to consider the permanent impression which it is destined to leave on the minds of the French army. There is the more reason for so doing, as the opinions of French military men will be reflected those of soldiers the whole world over, for all of whom this trial will be of lasting importance. The era of human wars is unhappy far from closed. Any general, French or foreign, may be placed before long in the position which Bazaine occupied three years ago, and under such circumstances, the precedent of Bazaine's case could not fail to be used, either by the General himself as a guide for his conduct, or by a court martial sitting in judgment on the General, if he repeated any of the offenses and errors for which the ex-Commander of Metz has been condemned. The Trianon court of Metz, in fact, laid down a clear code of military duties, and it concerns officers of every nation, and to a certain degree civilians also, to know accurately what those duties are.

THE COURTS OF THE BAZAINE IMPRISONMENT.

Bazaine was virtually condemned on nine counts, although these nine were nominally condemned into four—

First—For having capitulated with an army without having done so that was possible to defeat the enemy, or, at all events, to inflict heavy losses on them.

Second—For having surrendered a citadel under similar conditions—that is, before having exhausted all the means of resistance.

Third—For having surrendered the citadel without destroying the fortifications, arsenals and stores, and his forces without having previously burned their flags, caused their rifles to be broken and their guns to be rendered useless.

Fourth—For having spoken in an encouraging manner to his soldiers, and to private soldiers, with a view to impressing upon them that resistance was useless.

Fifth—For having entered into negotiations with the principal generals under his orders, concealed from these generals that he had already entered into negotiations with the enemy, and that he subsequently induced them to approve certain resolutions of his, under wrong information.

Sixth—For having wrongfully tried to shield his own responsibility by the approval of the generals who, as above said, had been deceived by him.

Seventh—For having entered into negotiations of a military and political character with an individual who had no credentials to show, and for having informed this person, who turned out to be a spy of the enemy, that the citadel and garrison could not hold out beyond a specified date.

Eighth—For having previously to the blockade in Metz acted in defiance of certain despatches, which assured him to march to the relief of Metz; and for having on his part, when he received such despatches, declaring that such a march was impossible.

Ninth—For having sacrificed his military duty to political considerations, and having in particular refused to recognize and act in co-operation with a government that was being overthrown by the military of the nation, which was under the government of the land, the Emperor being a prisoner and the Empress having fled from the country.

WHAT BAZAINE SHOULD HAVE DONE IN METZ.

As it is scarcely probable that a general of any importance outside France will ever find himself in Bazaine's political predicament—that is, be under the necessity of transferring his allegiance to a revolutionary government, sprung up in the midst of a war—we may dismiss the ninth count, and, examining only the first eight, proceed to consider what Bazaine should have done.

In the first place, then, after the Rhine army of 160,000 men was entrapped, he should have

spread it over several roads in order that it might reach the Meuse the faster and there operate in junction with MacMahon's forces. Had he done this, instead of massing all his men on a single road, the Germans would never have had time to head him at Mars-la-Tour. But, granted that by a miracle of promptitude the Germans had still succeeded in placing themselves between his army and the Meuse, then Bazaine, after defeating them at Mars-la-Tour, as he actually did, should have attacked them on the following day before reinforcements had arrived to their rescue.

Prince Frederick Charles acknowledges that if Bazaine had followed up his advantage at Mars-la-Tour by coming to action early the next morning the Germans would have been obliged to retreat, not being able to oppose the Meuse, and, as a consequence of their retreat, Bazaine and MacMahon would have been able to join their armies and make a stand on the plains of Châlons, where, with 300,000 men between them, they would have been almost invincible. Far from doing this, Bazaine spent the day after Mars-la-Tour in complete inactivity, then began a backward march upon Metz. The Germans, reinforced by this time, accordingly went in pursuit of him, defeated him at Gravelotte, and, having thus permanently cut off his communications with the Meuse, drove him into Metz and set to work to blockade him.

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Bazaine's incapacity—putting the most favorable construction on his negligence—thus caused the defeat of MacMahon, by allowing the latter to be entrapped. But, admitting, for argument's sake, that after doing his best to reach the Meuse, Bazaine had been vanquished by superior forces, strategy or by a combination of unfortunate adverse circumstances—admitting, in fact, that his retreat into Metz had been inevitable—then what should have been his conduct once he was blockaded? Here his duty became clear. To have attacked the Germans on the morrow of Mars-la-Tour perhaps required a certain dose of genius for the absence of which a general cannot be held criminal; but to play his part worthily inside Metz he only needed the common sense of good sense which must lurk in every officer of high rank.

The German army around Metz never at any time numbered more than 200,000 men; and, having in all no less than 170,000 men under him in Metz, Bazaine should have attacked them without respite, at all points, every day and night. He should have ordered sortie after sortie, kept the enemy continually on the lookout, risked any losses on his own side in order to inflict losses on them, harass, fatigue and dishearten them. In the military sort of any consequence which Bazaine did make, but to days only before the capitulation (October 10), the Germans suffered such loss as proved conclusively what would have been the result had these sorties been commenced and repeated without cease since the beginning of September. But the Germans themselves admit that if Bazaine had offered a determined resistance the consequences must have been these: the Germans could not have kept up the siege with 200,000 men, and would have been obliged to send for reinforcements and so weaken the force around Paris and on the Loire. Meanwhile the French armies on the Loire, having less or no hostile forces to contend with, would have been in a position to relieve Paris, which was only blockaded by 180,000 men, and the Germans, too prudent to risk a struggle with the Loire armies and with the garrison of Paris at such unequal odds, would have raised the siege of the capital. Indeed, as it was General Moltke doubted at the beginning of October whether it would be possible to continue the siege of Paris, and was making preparations for retreat. The siege of Paris was only commenced under the supposition that the Parisians would not resist. Once it became evident that they meant to hold out, it became impossible to blockade them effectively, and the army in Metz done its duty. General Moltke was too shrewd to expose himself to a

defeat under the walls of Paris, for such a defeat must have degenerated into a rout.

WHAT BAZAINE SHOULD HAVE DONE IF FORCED TO CAPITULATE.

"But," it may be urged, "if Bazaine had properly defended himself in Metz he would only have succeeded in massing the entire strength of the Germans round his citadel, and he would have been forced to yield in the end." Possibly; but a general's duty is to consider how best he may serve the common interests of the country, and the prospect of using his own army as his business to check his operations. If Bazaine had forced the Germans to raise the siege of Paris the capitulation of Metz would have been but of secondary importance. He was bound, however, to prolong his resistance in Metz until it was absolutely impossible, from want of food and ammunition, to hold out any longer, and, when the capitulation loomed ahead as unavoidable, then he should have opened negotiations with the enemy and stipulated that all his garrison should march out with the honors of war—that is, free to go away with their arms under pledge of not fighting again during the campaign. If the enemy had been kept in ignorance of the exhaustion of supplies inside the city it is probable they might have acceded to these terms; but they did not, and then it was Bazaine's duty to act as Moltke did at Sebastopol—blow up his fortifications, destroy the arsenals and casemates, smash all his rifles and cannon, drench his ammunition, and burn his flags and stores, so that nothing whatever should have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Thus the capitulation of Metz would have been one of the grandest, most heroic on record.

SUMMARY.

Now, suppose Bazaine had acted in the manner above sketched, the Germans, in possession of dismantled Metz, would have one of two alternatives—they might either have marched back upon Paris or have offered to conclude peace, and all the probabilities are that they would have adopted the latter course. To march back and face the Loire armies and those of the North, arrayed with the Paris garrisons under the walls of the capital, would have been a measure demanding more men and more energy than the Germans would have been able to bring to bear after a protracted warfare round Metz. The armies under Paris would have had time to organize themselves, to fortify their positions, to establish themselves securely on every river and eminence around Paris, and the Germans would have known well that if they attacked these reorganized armies unsuccessfully their retreat from France must have resembled the rout of Napoleon's Grand Army in the Russian campaign of 1812.

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de Grèze in Paris, in 1873, for conspiring against Louis XI. This marshal did not go to the scaffold with a brave face. He screamed and struggled, and the executioner struck him four times with the axe before severing his head from his body.

St. Pol's execution was intended by Louis XI, to act as a warning to the entire French nobility, who had been growing very turbulent. It was the first blow struck at the feudal independence and inviolability of the nobles, and it succeeded well in its object.

CHARLES DE CONTANT, DUKE AND MARSHAL DE BELLUGUET, was the next French marshal who suffered death at the headman's hands. He was the intimate friend of Henri IV., who had thrice saved his life in battle; but, being of a restless temper and unscrupulously ambitious, he was constantly dabbling in conspiracies against his king and benefactor. Twice Henri IV. detected and pardoned him; but Biron's third conspiracy was exceptionally grave. He lent himself to a plan hatched by Spain and the Duke of Savoy for marching France into several small States, and his reward for this disloyal co-operation was to be the sovereignty of Burgundy and the hand of the Duke of Savoy's daughter. When the conspiracy was detected, Henri IV. sent for Biron and promised he should not be punished if he made a full confession. But he obstinately refused to speak, and so the King abandoned him to his fate. He was tried by the Parliament of Paris, sentenced to death, and beheaded inside the Bastille in 1602, at the age of 40. If ever a marshal justly suffered death it was assuredly this Biron; nevertheless Henri IV., in the excellence of his heart, repented to his dying day not having more pardoned the man who had so ungratefully requited his numerous benefits. He used to say, "Poor Biron, conspiring was a second nature with him." The next two marshals were victims of Cardinal Richelieu.

DUKE AND MARSHAL DE MONTMORENCY, premier peer of France, was the commander of the Huguenot faction, made a prisoner at the battle of Castelnaudary, where the Protestants suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Louis XIII's Catholic troops, he was tried for high treason, convicted and executed in the court yard of the Capitol at Toulouse, in 1632. He was 37 years old.

MARSHAL DE MARILLAT was another Huguenot. He conspired against Richelieu and was kidnapped by stealth at night from the midst of his camp, and beheaded in Paris in 1632. We come now to two victims of the Revolution.

MARSHAL BARON DE LUCKNER was of German origin. He served under Frederick II. in the Seven Years' war, and inflicted great losses on the French. But at the peace he settled in France, got naturalized and was raised to the marshalate. At the Revolution he was given a command in the French army; took Constance and Menin and defeated the Austrians at Valenciennes, but the Revolutionary tribunal decided that a marshal, baron and an ex-German could be no true republican, and so guillotined him in 1794.

PHILIPPE DE MOULLE was born in 1715, and was one of the most distinguished soldiers of the last century. In 1789 he was appointed Governor of Versailles, and when the mob came from Paris, on the 6th of October, to carry off the royal family, he fought in defence of his sovereign until wounded and overpowered. The terrorists numbered this in 1794 and guillotined him like his colleague, Luckner.

MARSHAL NEY, who was shot in 1815, was the seventh Marshal of France who suffered public execution. As is well known, his crime consisted in having deserted to Napoleon's side when he was sent by Louis XVIII. to check the Emperor, who had fled from Elba. He fought at Waterloo and was promised amnesty by the terms of the capitulation of Paris, but party spirit against the royalists was too hot against him. He was tried by the House of Peers and sentenced to death with but one dissentient vote. This vote was that of the late Duke de Broglie, father of the present French Premier.

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